Trustless parallel local search for effective distributed algorithm
  discovery by Besarabov, Zvezdin & Kolev, Todor
Trustless parallel local search for effective distributed algorithm
discovery
Zvezdin Besarabov
University College London
London, United Kingdom
zcabzbe@ucl.ac.uk
Todor Kolev
Comrade Cooperative
Sofia, Bulgaria
t.kolev@comrade.coop
ABSTRACT
Metaheuristic search strategies have proven their effectiveness
against man-made solutions in various contexts. They are gener-
ally effective in local search area exploitation, and their overall
performance is largely impacted by the balance between exploration
and exploitation.
Recent developments in parallel local search explore methods
to take advantage of the efficient local exploitation of searches
and reach impressive results. This however restricts the scaling
potential to nodes within a private, trusted computer cluster.
In this research we propose a novel blockchain protocol that
allows parallel local search to scale to untrusted and anonymous
computational nodes. The protocol introduces publicly verifiable
performance evaluation of the local optima reported by each node,
creating a competitive environment between the local searches.
That is strengthened with economical stimuli for producing good
solutions, that provide coordination between the nodes, as every
node tries to explore different sections of the search space to beat
their competition.
KEYWORDS
Metaheuristics, Neural architecture search, Blockchain, Trustless
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1 INTRODUCTION
Metaheuristic search strategies allow for an automated methodology
to effectively search for approximative solutions in a specific
problem search space. Recent search strategies [1] [2] [3] in
particular have reached impressive results in finding solutions
beating the best man-made algorithms at the time.
Most well-known metaheuristic algorithms spend on average 90%
of their execution time exploiting the search space [4]. Balancing
exploration and exploitation is a critical question in their design.
Most new generation metaheuristics approach this balance by first
exploring and then switching the focus to local exploitation upon
specific conditions [5]. This timing is crucial and optimizing it can
yield significantly better results, the findings conclude.
This is primarily a problem for sequential search approaches
however. Using parallelism introduces the hypothesis that we
can take advantage of the efficient local search area exploitation
of sequential searches, by executing many of these searches in
different areas of the search space concurrently. Similar research
has shown impressive results [6], especially when we are further
optimizing how, when, and where we are starting and ending the
local search processes. Increasing the number of processes also
seems to correlate with increments in performance.
Scaling similar parallel local search systems requires a trusted
network of computers, where all machines are truthfully executing
their local search process and are reporting the correct findings.
This restricts the scaling potential of similar approaches to central-
ized resource pools, such as data centers.
With the advent of Blockchain technologies [7] we have received
the ability to create publicly trusted and verifiable state machines
for arbitrary tasks [8], for example in finance, governance, and
supply chains. This could also be applied to bring trust in a network
of untrusted local search processes.
In this paper we hypothesize that we can utilize these tech-
nologies to design a parallel local search framework where the
individual computational nodes are untrusted, arbitrary, and pseudo
anonymous. This can practically allow for higher scalability as
many more parties have the ability to contribute to the search.
In addition, the use of Blockchain alleviates the need to have a
centralized controller which orchestrates the local search processes.
These rules can be enforced directly through the Blockchain state
machine. If such a system is designed, this can mean that an arbi-
trary set of computing nodes can come together and find effective
solutions to a given common problem without requiring trust or a
governor. If we also add economical incentives for finding solutions,
such a framework could become a self-sustaining, self-initiating
environment where parties come to work on new solutions to
problems organically.
More precisely, we are looking to devise a protocol for a
Blockchain network where independent parties are incentivised
to run a local search algorithm in a different point in a common
search space and compete with the others in finding better so-
lutions. The participants compete by exchanging proofs about
the performance of their local optima, and they use this to decide
whether to continue further optimizing in their local area or restart
their search algorithm in a different one. This mechanism implies
that it is in the competitors’ best interest to explore new areas of
the search space in order to gain a competitive advantage, and they
have to collaborate on a feedback level to do so. From this point of
view, this system represents an embarrassingly parallel local search
system.
1.1 Related work
The current hypothesis has been motivated from our previous work
with developing predictive strategies for cryptocurrency markets
[9]. While applying a novel Neural Architecture Search approach
[3] for the problem, we often reached some of the efficiency and
scalability problems of similar sequential approaches. Systems for
parallel hyperparameter tuning and inference have been previously
explored before with largely positive results [10] [11]. For example,
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a “hopper” based neural network parallelization trainer scored a
tenfold reduction in time compared to standard parallelism [12].
Recent developments in classical approaches such as Cooperative
Co-Evolution [13] and Multi-population Differential Evolution
[14] demonstrate how parallelism can be a natural next step in
improving similar approximative searches. We have also seen
the development of competitive parallel optimisation strategies
that beat the most performing metaheuristics at the time [15],
which shows interesting research potential in other competitive
approaches.
All of the aforementioned approaches focus on improving dis-
trubuted search in a privately owned network of computers, but
there is recently growing demand for more open and shared ecosys-
tems. Coin.AI [16] presents a novel Useful Poof-of-Work Blockchain
consensus mechanism based on distributed neural network train-
ing, with possible applications in accelerating algorithmic search.
Another interesting concept is Hydra [17], which presents a crowd-
sourced and fault tolerant way to scale neural model training and
data collection from an arbitrary set of untrusted devices. In a
similar manner OpenMined [18] allows models to be trained on
a private, distributed dataset, and SingularityNet [19] creates a
decentralised marketplace for algorithms as a service. Perhaps the
closest match to a parallel local search is the platform Kaggle [20],
which runs centralised and public competitions for the creation of
better algorithmic solutions.
These approaches are either accelerating search strategies in a
private set of computers, or scale openly on untrusted nodes to
improve algorithm tuning without direct focus on an automated
search process. The need for a solution which focuses on algorith-
mic search, scales to untrusted participants, and takes advantage of
a competitive and economically stimulated environment led us to
our current hypothesis.
1.2 Section overview
Section 3 introduces the novel blockchain protocol for a scalable
parallel local search system by creating an improved environment
for the execution of search strategies. This is defined more formally
in Section 4, where we describe this functionality as rules of a
blockchain state machine for the Tendermint framework, and
Section 5 performs security analysis on the limitations of the
protocol.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Blockchain
Satoshi Nakamoto’s introduction of Bitcoin in November 2008
[7] has often been hailed as a radical development in money and
currency, but the application of Blockchain as a tool for distributed
consensus reaches far beyond. Later came Ethereum [8] with the
ability to run custom blockchain applications within it. On a high
level, a blockchain is a set of nodes that store and execute the
same state machine with the same data. When someone wants to
interact with it, they send a state machine transition to all nodes.
This is checked for validity by every node and executed against
the state machine. A few recent examples of its applications are
within the areas of IoT security [21], IoT monetization [22], 5G
communication [23], data source verification to combat Deepfake
videos [24], and various Machine Learning approaches [25].
2.2 Tendermint
Tendermint [26] is a framework for building a blockchain network.
Given an arbitrary state machine, it provides all other functionality
necessary for running a blockchain - P2P networking, transaction
creation, signing, and propagation, a consensus engine for block
creation, propagation, and verification, as well as deterministic
synchronisation of the machine state following block creation. The
consensus is Byzantine fault tolerant as it can tolerate the arbitrary
failure of up to 13 of the participating peers.
A network based on Tendermint works as follows. First, nodes
submit transactions that reach every other node in the P2P network
and enter the nodes’mempool . Every node has a specific amount
of “consensus power”, and the rules for acquiring it are defined by
the developer in the state machine. Upon a configurable event, a
deterministic decision function is executed that selects one node on
the base of its consensus power. This node selects transactions from
themempool , creates a block, and submits it to the network. Blocks
are created on a specific blocktime schedule. The block has to be
signed by nodes with at least 23 of the network’s total consensus
power in order for it to be accepted on the blockchain. If this step
fails within a timeout, a new block creator is selected. Nodes with
non-zero consensus power are called blockchain validators.
Any functionalities outside of these, for example issuing and
transacting a crypto asset, or “staking” assets to gain consensus
power, can be freely implemented as rules within the state machine
itself.
3 PARALLEL LOCAL SEARCH IN A
BLOCKCHAIN
The idea of the protocol, which we will call “ScyNet”, is to create
an open environment where financially incentivised computing
nodes can execute local search algorithms and compete with each
other in finding optimal solutions to a specific problem. This
happens with minimal coordination between the participants -
everyone knows the bounds of the search space and the problem
definition, but the only information exchanged throughout the
search are proofs of the performance of the local optimum of the
participants. This feature brings the self-governing aspect that
omits a centralized controller to guide the local searches. If one
node is consistently underperforming compared to its rivals, then it
is stuck in a bad local optimum and should restart its local search in
a different, possibly random point in the search space. This method
of organization is more organic, spontaneous, potentially less
computationally efficient, but allows us to scale to an unbounded
number of untrusted search processes, which inevitably increases
the probability of finding the global optimum.
The general concept of ScyNet is visualized in Figure 1, with
further clarifications in the following sections.
3.1 Main entities and roles
A specific implementation of ScyNet for a chosen problem (for
example, stock market predictions) represents a single blockchain
network and is called a Domain. Every domain defines an unique
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Figure 1: Top: A high-level overview of the main partici-
pants, interactions, and lifecycle of ScyNet.
Bottom: How Agent performance is verified during a tour-
nament. Depending on the domain, this includes either a
challenger or an external source of real-time ground truth.
utility token that is used to form consensus and incentivise par-
ticipants. Three types of nodes, members of the network, exist -
data nodes, searchers, and clients. Data nodes interface the real
world by selling data related to the domain problem. Searchers
can use that data to execute a local search algorithm that creates
algorithmic agents as optimal solutions to the problem. With every
announced agent, searchers submit cryptographic proofs of the
agents’ performance. Then, clients can explore these proofs and
can contact specific searchers to request access to the produced
solutions, for example by paying a subscription. This provides
the crucial economical incentive for searchers, and therefore data
nodes, to invest resources in this problem in the first place.
3.2 Tournament validation
Tournaments are the way searchers exchange performance proofs
to “verify” their agents, and hence compete. They are regularly
scheduled and continuously running - a tournament has a start
date, which is right after the previous one ends. Searchers have
the right to submit one or more of their agents for verification by
paying a submission fee before the start of the next tournament.
Tournaments cryptographically prove an agent’s performance
when searchers submit their agents’ outputs, or “signals”, given
specific input data or conditions. This depends on the type of
algorithmic problem being solved in the domain. The first type
represents real-time predictions, such as stock market trading or
weather forecasts. The problem definition includes a consistent
schedule, known as real-time ticks, when such predicions should
be made, and everyone knows how to get the current ground truth
of the prediction target. During a tournament, the competing
searchers are required to provide real-time predictions from their
agents for every tick during the tournament. When the ground
truth becomes available, a subset of the network nodes, validators,
evaluate the accuracy of the predictions to form consensus on a
ranking of the participating agents.
The other type of problems are dataset input-output problems,
such as self-driving algorithms or speech recognition. In this case,
the blockchain state machine pseudorandomly selects multiple
nodes that are labeled as challengers. Every such node is respon-
sible to provide a dataset with which to challenge the competing
agents to resolve it. Depending on the problem, this can be either
algorithmically generated, or retrieved from a reliable source. The
searchers inference the dataset and publish the outputs of their
agents. After tournament closure, the validators compare the agent
outputs to the challenger ground truth and forms consensus on an
agent ranking.
All submitted agent outputs are first encrypted to avoid copying.
The submission fees collected before a tournament comprise
the tournament award, which is used to award the top performing
agents and the selected challengers, if applicable.
At no single point do the searchers reveal the mechanisms
behind their agents, allowing for a significant flexibility in how
these agents are created.
3.3 Agent utilization
Since searchers retain ownership of their agents, they can monetize
them in arbitrary ways, including offering them as a service via
subscription or per-use fees, or selling the underlying algorithm
altogether.
In a real-time predictive domain, it may also be possible for a
searcher to subscribe to the prediction stream of an agent of another
searcher, and use this as input data to its own agents, hence possibly
making a more informed prediction. This type of aggregation has
also been used previously to deliver explainable AI [27].
4 FORMAL SCYNET PROTOCOL DEFINITION
This section extends on Section 3 by clarifing how the presented fea-
tures are to be implemented and enforced. The ScyNet blockchain
protocol is designed as a Tendermint state machine and a set of
transactions to interact with it. Here we will describe the logical
rules of this state machine in relation to which transactions are
sent and when, as well as the validity rules for these transactions.
The blockchain protocol defines a trustless way in which a
group of nodes that internally execute local searches can agree on a
ranking between their local optima. We are assuming that software
is present on every node, not part of the blockchain consensus, that
defines and supports the following:
• The data formats used for datasets and agent signals;
• The error function for performance evaluation;
• Software to run, manage, and reinstantiate the local search
based on feedback from blockchain tournaments;
• For dataset domains, a method for generating or gathering
a new dataset on demand if the node is selected as a
challenger;
• Optionally, access to correctly formatted data that can be
sold on the blockchain if this node becomes a data node.
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4.1 Underlying blockchain
On a lower level, a ScyNet domain builds an independent blockchain
network and a blockchain structure. The network behaves similarly
to Bitcoin [7], where any external node can connect with other
peers, synchronize the blockchain, interact with the network by
signing transactions, as well as participate in the consensus by
verifying transactions and blocks.
4.1.1 Token. Every domain network creates a non-mintable
token of a fixed supply. This token is used in all network payments
to incentivise the consensus and commitments of the three types
of nodes - data nodes, searchers, and clients.
4.1.2 Consensus. By using Tendermint, most aspects of a
consensus mechanism are already provided - block creator selection,
verification, propagation, as well as Bysantine Fault Tolerance to
various attacks. What has to be specified by us is how network
participants gain network consensus power. While this is not a
focus in our protocol as there are many good implementations
based on the use case, we are recommending the use of a variant of
Proof-of-Stake [28] called “Coin Age based selection”, as used in
PeerCoin [29]. The consensus power is a function of the balance
a node has “staked” and the time since it did that. However any
of the more prominent PoS examples can be implemented here,
including more recently Snow White [30].
4.2 Domain configuration
The definition of a domain network includes setting a few specific
parameters. This defines the tournament schedule and validation
parameters, which are part of the problem definition:
• problemType (“real-time” or “dataset”) - Type of algorith-
mic problem;
• tournamentStartFrequency (Integer, milliseconds) - The
interval between the start of two consecutive tournaments;
• challengerSubmissionTimeout (Integer, milliseconds) - Time-
out for the the selected network challengers to submit a
dataset;
• datasetSignalKeyTimeout (Integer, milliseconds) - Time-
out for challengers and searchers to send dataset signal
decryption keys;
• rankingTimeout (Integer, milliseconds) - Timeout after
the tournament where validators must submit tournament
results;
• realTimeFrequency (Integer, milliseconds) - For real-time
problems, the interval between two real-time ticks;
• minAgentChallengers (Integer) - Minimum number of
nodes that have to independently challenge a submitted
agent;
• minAgentChallengerVotingPower (Percentage) - Minimum
share of the network voting power that has to challenge a
submitted agent;
• minAgentSubmitStake (Domain tokens) - Minimum stake
for a searcher to submit an agent for validation in a tour-
nament;
• minPricePublishStake (Domain tokens) - Minimum stake
for a searcher or data node to advertise their agent/data
on the chain;
• rentFee (Domain tokens) - Fee withdrawn when a client
rents an agent.
4.3 Timing constraints
The start timestamp of all tournaments is defined as UNIX Epoch
+ k*tournamentStartFrequency for all k > 0. Also, if the domain
is real-time, the generalized timestamp of all real-time ticks is
UNIX Epoch + m*realTimeFrequency. All other timing constraints
during the ScyNet livecycle are relative to the start of a specific
tournament and are defined as follows:
• tournament end = the tournament start timestamp of the
next tournament;
• challenger submission deadline = tournament start +
challenдerSubmissionTimeout ;
• dataset key deadline = tournament end +
datasetSiдnalKeyTimeout ;
• ranking deadline = tournament end + rankinдTimeout ;
When we describe that a certain event happens at/after/before a
given timestamp, this event should have happened at/after/before
a node receives a block with the given timestamp.
4.4 Role protocol
This section defines the legal way for a node with a particular role
to interact with the blockchain state machine, indirectly defining
the machine itself. References will be made to both the domain
configuration (Section 4.2) and the different network transactions
(Section 4.5). Network participants may execute multiple roles at
the same time (for example, to be a searcher and a data node).
4.4.1 Data node protocol. In order for a node to become
a data node, provide a data agent (real-time stream or a specific
dataset), and advertise it on the blockchain, it must:
(1) Submit publish_data_price transaction (Section 4.5.8). This
stakes (or locks) a voluntary amount of tokens
≥ minPricePublishStake , demonstrating confidence in the
data agent;
(2) Listen for rent transactions (4.5.9) that are directed to the
node;
(3) Communicate with the sender off-chain and privately give
access to the requested quantity or duration of data.
(4) When the node wants to stop providing a specific data
agent, it sends publish_data_price transaction (4.5.8) with
a stake of 0. This will declare the agent as unavailable and
return the node’s stake.
4.4.2 Searcher protocol. In order to verify and sell an agent
on the network, a searcher should:
(1) Send submit_agent transaction (4.5.1). This stakes a volun-
tary amount of tokens ≥ minAдentSubmitStake;
(2) On the next tournament start, the blockchain state is
updated so that agents with within the highest
tournamentCuto f f % stake are allowed to participate in
the tournament.
(3) If the searcher’s agent is participating and domain is real-
time:
(a) Wait until right before every specific real-time tick
during the tournament;
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(b) Generate an AES-256 key, generate an agent signal,
encrypt the signal, and send submit_signal transaction
(4.5.3) before the real-time tick;
(c) After the current real-time tick and before the next
one, reveal the decryption key with publish_signal_-
decryption_key transaction (4.5.5);
(d) Repeat from 3a for every real-time tick until tourna-
ment end.
(4) If the searcher’s agent is participating and domain is
dataset:
(a) Wait tournament start, after which a distributed pseu-
dorandom algorithm selects the tournament chal-
lengers. Listen for publish_dataset transactions (4.5.2)
from the challengers until the challenger submission
deadline;
(b) Download the datasets, generate all agent signals,
generate an AES-256 key, encrypt the signals, and send
submit_signal transaction (4.5.3) before tournament
end;
(c) Wait for tournament end and reveal the decryption
key with publish_signal_decryption_key transaction
(4.5.5) before the dataset key deadline.
(5) After successful validation and if the searcher decides,
they may submit publish_agent_price transaction 4.5.7 to
advertise the monetization of their agent, also placing a
voluntary stake;
(6) Listen for rent transactions (4.5.9) that are directed to the
searcher;
(7) Communicate with the sender off-chain and privately give
access to the requested agent use.
(8) When the searcher wants to stop providing a data agent, it
sends publish_agent_price transaction (4.5.7) with a stake
of 0. This will declare the agent as unavailable and return
the searcher’s stake.
4.4.3 Challenger protocol (dataset domains). Challenger
selection is similar to the way Tendermint selects a pseudoran-
dom block creator given a set of nodes weighted by consensus
power, except that here multiple nodes are selected and labeled as
challengers.
Challengers are selected right after tournament start as follows:
(1) Retrieve a list of current network nodes, sorted by their
power;
(2) Hash the previous block’s header and the consensus signa-
tures in the current block;
(3) Use that hash as a seed in a deterministic RNG algorithm
and generate a pseudorandom integer in the interval ∈
(1, totalValidatorPower );
(4) Start iterating the node list, summing their power until the
sum surpasses the selected integer;
(5) Mark the node where we stopped iterating as a challenger
if they are not a searcher participating in the tournament;
(6) Loop from step 3 until:
(a) There are at least minAдentChallenдers challengers
selected;
(b) The total consensus power of selected challengers is
at leastminAдentChallenдerVotinдPower %;
(c) There is not a challenger that comprises more than
10% of the total challenger consensus power;
Once selected, every challenger must:
(1) Run a domain-specific algorithm to generate a validation
dataset;
(2) Generate an AES-256 key, encrypt the dataset outputs,
and submit the dataset and its encrypted outputs through
the publish_dataset transaction(4.5.2) by the challenger
submission deadline;
(3) Wait for tournament end and submit dataset outputs de-
cryption key via publish_dataset_decryption_key (4.5.4)
before the dataset key deadline.
4.4.4 Common protocol for blockchain validators. Other
than building the underlying consensus, blockchain validators also
judge the performance of the agents in a tournament:
(1) If domain is real-time:
(a) Listen for submit_signal transactions (4.5.3) from the
searchers;
(b) Listen for publish_signal_decryption_key transac-
tions (4.5.5);
(c) Wait for tournament end and decrypt all received
signals;
(d) Make a local ranking of agents based on their predic-
tion accuracy.
(2) If domain is dataset:
(a) Listen for publish_dataset transactions (4.5.2) from
the challengers;
(b) Listen for submit_signal transactions (4.5.3) from the
searchers;
(c) Listen for publish_dataset_decryption_key (4.5.4) from
the other challengers;
(d) Listen for publish_signal_decryption_key transac-
tions (4.5.5) from the searchers;
(e) Decrypt all received signals and make a local ranking
of the agents based on their median score among all
challenger datasets;
(3) Submit the local ranking in a publish_tournament_ranking
(4.5.6) transaction. It must be included in a block with a
timestamp before the ranking deadline.
4.4.5 Common protocol for every node. Other than syncing
with the blockchain, every node in the network also ensures other
nodes are following the requirements of their roles. If a node
misbehaves, they or their agents are marked as disqualified on the
blockchain. Disqualifications affect the node’s eligibility to receive
the tournament award, as well as their ability to continue sending
specific transactions (Clarification in Section 4.5). Disqualifications
last only for the specific tournament.
(1) Mark any competing in a tournament agent as disqualified
if any of the following is true:
(a) In a real-time domain, the searcher did not send a valid
submit_signal (4.5.3) or publish_signal_decryption_-
key (4.5.5) transaction for every real-time tick;
(b) In a dataset domain, the searcher did not send a
valid submit_signal (4.5.3) by the tournament end or
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publish_signal_decryption_key (4.5.5) by the dataset
key deadline.
(2) In a dataset domain, mark any challenger as disqualified if
any of the following is true:
(a) The node did not send a valid publish_dataset (4.5.2)
by the challenger submission deadline or publish_-
dataset_decryption_key (4.5.4) by the dataset key
deadline.
(3) After the proposer deadline for a tournament, mark every
validator that did not send a valid publish_tournament_-
ranking (4.5.6) for the specific tournament as disqualified.
(4) For the duration of the tournament, let bl denote the
amount of blocks created by a specific validator and txs -
the number of all transactions included in them. For every
network validator, calculate bl + txs after tournament end.
This called block creator points and is later used in the
tournament reward;
4.4.6 Tournament reward. After the ranking deadline, all
agent submission fees that comprise the tournament reward are
used to reward the participants in the tournament. This includes
the winning agents, participating challengers, and validators that
created blocks during the tournament. The funds are allocated as
follows:
• 10% of the funds are split among all non-disqualified valida-
tors that created blocks during the tournament proportional
to their block creator points;
• If the domain is dataset, another 10% of the total reward is
split among the participating non-disqualified challengers
in proportion to their consensus power;
• 5% of the total reward is sent to a predefined address,
responsible for maintaining and further expanding the
ScyNet protocol and implementation;
• The rest of the funds are allocated among the top 50%
non-disqualified agents in ratio of their scores.
• If all agents have been disqualified, the remains of the
reward are transferred to the next tournament reward.
4.5 Transaction types
All interaction with the blockchain state machine is executed
through transactions. In the following subsections we very briefly
summarize the types of transactions used in this protocol. A more
complete description and validity constraints is available in the
following document [31].
4.5.1 submit_agent(UU ID, stake). Sent by a searcher node
to notify that it has an agent that it wants to verify in the next
tournament.
4.5.2 publish_dataset(inputsURL, inputsHash,
encryptedSiдnalsURL, siдnalsHash). Used by tournament chal-
lengers to publish the inputs of their personal dataset.
4.5.3 submit_signal(aдentUU ID, encryptedSiдnal). Sent by
a searcher node to submit an AES-256 encryptedSiдnal from a spe-
cific agent (aдentUU ID).
4.5.4 publish_dataset_decryption_key(key). Sent by tour-
nament challengers after the end of a tournament to reveal the
decryption key behind publish_dataset.
4.5.5 publish_signal_decryption_key(aдentUU ID, key).
Sent by a searcher a specific amount of time after signing submit_-
signal to reveal the AES-256 key by which the original signal was
encrypted.
4.5.6 publish_tournament_ranking(rankinд). Submits the
local tournament ranking of one validator.
4.5.7 publish_agent_price(aдentUU ID, scheme, price, stake).
Advertises purchasing rules for a previously verified agent.
4.5.8 publish_data_price(dataUU ID, dataParams, scheme,
price, stake). Advertises purchasing rules for a dataset.
4.5.9 rent(UU ID, quantity). Purchases access to a previously
advertised agent or data.
5 ATTACK RESILIENCE
In this section, we describe how the specifics of the ScyNet transac-
tion protocol build resilience against various types of failures.
5.1 Underlying blockchain security
The Tendermint framework allows for the synchronous processing
of transactions that propagate through the network in a determin-
istic manner. There is no disparity in the system, meaning that
replay attacks are not possible. Because of the voting mechanism
for consensus, if one party obtains ≥ 13 of the network’s consensus
power, it can stop block verification. The system can be arbitrarily
modified with ≥ 23 of the consensus power.
Additionally, the transaction signing makes impersonation not
possible without access to a node’s private key.
5.2 Transaction spam
In the detailed description of the transactions [31], every transaction
type that does not require a fee has constraints on its usage for a time
period. Sending a transaction outside of these limits will invalidate
it. Tendermint nodes do not propagate invalid transactions they
received, limiting the extent of similar attacks. Transactions with
fees have monetary incentives against this behavior. This builds
resilience against Denial-of-Service transaction attacks.
5.3 Agent signal copying
A searcher may be tempted to copy a rival’s agent signals during
a tournament and submit them as their own. However, all agent
signals are submitted encrypted. The decryption key is revealed
after the deadline for submission of a specific signal, protecting
against copying.
A searcher may instead copy all submitted ciphertexts of a rival
and then copy the decryption key. However, when submitting a
signal, the searcher is required to encrypt both the signal and their
public key, signing the package with their private key.
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5.4 Service failure
If a client has paid a searcher or a data node to utilize its agent
or data, the providing node can theoretically deny access to the
service, as it is not enforced by the blockchain consensus. However,
this will damage the node’s reputation and therefore its ability to
monetize its past and future agents, which likely diminishes the
reason to create them in the first place. It has to be noted that for
this mechanism to work, the nodes that sell data and agents should
not be anonymous and they should establish real-world reputation.
5.5 Agent submission failure
A searcher may submit an agent for participation in a tournament
and then fail to send a required timed agent signal or decryption
key. In this case, the they only disadvantage themselves and will
be disqualified.
5.6 Challenger failure
In dataset domains, failing to send a valid, readable, dataset or
an output decryption key by the deadlines will disqualify that
challenger.
Submitting a valid dataset with incorrect outputs is possible,
as the network does not distinguish between an inaccurate agent
and bad testing data. The challenger can also secretly provide the
unencrypted correct outputs to a competing searcher, giving them
an unfair advantage. However, because the agent’s performance is
its median from all challenger datasets, the performance measure-
ment is resilient up to the arbitrary failure of half of all challengers.
Section 4.4.3 also defines restrictions to ensure that the amount of
challengers is always sufficiently large.
6 LIMITATIONS
Overall while very scalable, because of the limited communica-
tion, this trustless parallel local search approach is likely to lose
computational efficiency the more local searches there are. This is
because there is no cheap and direct way in which a new network
member can ensure that they are exploring a brand new section
in the search area. This should become less of a problem in more
complicated search areas, such as with Neural Architecture Search
[1] [2] [3], where starting from a random search point is more
likely to be unique anyways.
Currently the protocol is designed for searches for data-based
approximative solutions, which are either making real-time pre-
dictions from new data, or inferencing a specific dataset. Due
to network restrictions very fast-paced or low-latency predictive
problems are infeasible. This is also not suitable for dataset prob-
lems where there is no practical way in which a node can create
or source a piece of testing dataset which is not already publicly
known. Sensitive or private data is also not directly applicable, but
this can be mitigated with homomorphic encryption and federated
learning approaches as in [18].
7 FURTHERWORK
While the protocol has been proposed, it must be more thoroughly
analysed and simulated, especially to prove that the potential
attacks in Sections 5.2, 5.4, 5.6 are economically infeasible. The
protcol can also be expanded to support data-free problems, such
as Reinforcement Learning solutions, by allowing challengers to
run a RL environment instead of sourcing a dataset.
In longer-term, our plans are to use the presented blockchain
protocol to implement a public blockchain network, which we will
also call “ScyNet”.
Even with a small number of initially participating nodes, ScyNet
can be a meaningful source of algorithmic solutions that is entirely
automated and autonomous. The only resource that this network
requires to produce continuously improving solutions is computing
power.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented an open competitive trustless environment of algo-
rithm creators, which perform local search strategies and coordinate
their performance results with the other participants. This in turn
allows said participants to select their next search area more effi-
ciently.
The biggest contribution of this research is the creation of the
publicly verifiable secure evaluation function behind the blockchain
tournaments. This removes the need of trusting third parties or
other participants in the network and provides a fair and unbiased
competitive environment. Coupled with the aforementioned mech-
anism for search space diversity, this trustless system can scale to a
massive number of parallel local searches, further increasing the
probability of finding the global optimum.
While this is applicable in various searches for approximative
algorithms, we believe that the most interesting application is in
the domain of Neural Architecture Search (NAS). Research in the
area has emphasized on the great potential of NAS and its current
limitations on scalability and search space diversity [1] [2] [3]. A
good further hypothesis is to analyze if the performance of NAS
can be improved through our approach.
Our future work will be towards providing a reference imple-
mentation of the presented blockchain protocol and establishing
an operational network of computing nodes.
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